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Since the appearance of his remarkable Torts in the Conflict
of Laws1 in 1942, Moffatt Hancock has been a force to be reckoned
with in the battleground known as the conflict of laws. The present
volume performs the welcome service of gathering into one convenient package an impressive number of his later contributions in the
same field.
It is no secret that the period of Moffatt Hancock's engagement has been one of enormous excitement and change in the conflict of laws, a time in which earlier expressions of heretical doubt
by such pioneers as Walter Wheeler Cook2 and David Cavers3 have
blossomed into an all-out assault on the temple of ancient wisdom
and on its holy scripture, the Restatement of 1934." Professor
Hancock has been in the vanguard of that assault. His Studies in
Modern Choice-of-Law5 is an invaluable record both of the battle
itself and of his own important role in the victory. And victory it
has been for Moffatt Hancock and his fellow revolutionaries: rare
indeed are the legal scholars who have had the satisfaction of such
widespread judicial acceptance of their unorthodox ideas. "It is one
of the chief purposes of this book," writes the author, "to illustrate
the working of the new methodology in practice."6
Professor Hancock's basic thesis is laid out in the first chapter,
in which he examines three approaches to the choice-of-law prob7
rem: "the cIassificatory, the functionaI and- the result-selective. M
The traditional, or classificatory, system assigned tort questions to
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the law of the place of wrong, real-property questions to the law of
the situs, and the like. That approach is subjected to the criticisms
that have become so familiar: the rules are "mechanistic," 8 "oversimplified," 9 "undiscriminating,"' 10 "uncertain"; 1 ' they are sometimes so "elastic" that they "can be manipulated to produce almost any result desired"' 2 and at other times "seem to create an
3
almost insurmountable barrier to an otherwise sensible solution.'
Most important, they lead to an inquiry "remote from the actual
problem of delimiting or reconciling domestic rules in a particular
case."' Hancock prefers the "sober, realistic"' 5 functional approach sometimes known as governmental-interest analysis. Under
this approach-first clearly articulated by Justice Stone in a series
of constitutional cases' 6 -the initial step is, as in a purely domestic
case, to determine whether, in light of its purposes, each state's
1
rule applies to the case. 7
Professor Hancock spends little time defending the functional
approach; that had already been done in some detail by his good
friend and my father, Brainerd Currie.' s For me the virtue of this
approach has been its application, to the interstate and international context, of the principle "that laws are adopted in order to
accomplish social goals and that they should be applied so as to
carry out their purposes."' 9 When a legislature has made clear the
extraterritorial scope of its legislation, the courts have no difficulty
in following the legislative command to the extent consistent with
constitutional limitations. The heart of the new learning is, as Professor Hancock insists, that choice-of-law decisions present, at
least in the first instance, opportunities for the interpretation of
competing laws. By means of this process a court may often be
able to conclude that there is no real conflict of laws despite the
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connection of the dispute with more than one jurisdiction; only one
law, properly construed in light of its purpose, applies by its own
terms to the case.
Professor Hancock's main endeavor is to illustrate the application of this functional analysis. In so doing he begins, as did
Brainerd Currie, with a decided domiciliary presumption: "[I]f one
starts thinking about the policy of a domestic legal rule in the interstate context asking, 'for whose benefit was this rule enacted?',
the obvious answer must be, 'primarily, at least, for the members
of the enacting community: voters and taxpayers domiciled
there'. '2 0 It bears emphasis at this point that such a presumption
is by no means implicit in a functional approach. Critics have exhibited a tendency to equate such an analytical method with a parochial preference for local residents,2 1 but the equation is fallacious. It would be entirely consistent to argue both that the
question is whether local law should be interpreted to apply to an
interstate case and that such laws should generally be interpreted
in accordance with traditional choice-of-law rules. The proponent
of functional analysis as such should not be required to shoulder
the additional burden of defending a presumption that laws are
passed out of selfish preference for local people over outsiders.
As the tone of this observation suggests, I have come to find it
much easier to accept the principle of functional analysis than to
share the presumption that laws are designed to benefit only local
people. Cynicism may suggest that parochialism is to be expected
in human affairs, but the practical advantages of getting along with
one's neighbors dampen the force of the conclusion that what Professor Cass Sunstein calls "naked preferences '22 for local people
are to be presumed even on the assumption of self-interest. Moreover, I am increasingly troubled by the relation of article IV's privileges and immunities clause to a choice-of-law view that tends to
find discrimination against citizens of other states simply because
of their citizenship. On the other hand, as my father and Herma
Hill Kay demonstrated in their painstaking study of the privileges
and immunities question,23 there are compelling reasons both of
20HANCOCK at xi; cf., e.g., BRAINERD
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policy and of constitutional law for not attributing to lawmakers a
desire to meddle with affairs that are not their legitimate concern.
A partial answer to this perplexity was provided by Justice Curtis
in a perceptive early opinion holding that Louisiana did not have
to give Mississippi widows community-property interests in Louisiana land, partly on the ground that a state might reasonably deem
it "proper not to interfere . . with the relations of married persons out of that State."2 4 This insight may be as valuable in interpreting state statutes as it is in interpreting the Constitution: it
may be appropriate to limit the application of local law to local
people when the sole purpose of the rule is the protection of the
individual and its extension to out-of-staters would frustrate the
policy of some other jurisdiction.
It should be added, moreover, that neither Professor Hancock
nor Brainerd Currie was prepared to argue that all laws should be
construed as inapplicable to outsiders. The former amply demonstrates in his chapters on land controversies that the policy of
transferability reflected in recording statutes, for example, demands their application for the benefit of nonresident buyers.2 5
The latter came increasingly to acknowledge that "the mere fact
that a suggested broad conception of a local interest will create
conflict with that of a foreign state is a sound reason why the conception should be re-examined, with a view to a more moderate
and restrained interpretation both of the policy and of the circumstances in which it must be applied to effectuate the forum's legitimate purpose. ' 26 Critics of the "parochialism" of these authors
should not overlook these important qualifications.
In any event, Professor Hancock's essays illustrate thoroughly,
clearly, and logically his application of a functional approach to a
rich variety of familiar cases and hypothetical situations. He takes
us carefully through interspousal tort immunity,2 7 guest statutes,2 8
limitations on wrongful-death damages 29 and on charitable beERD CURRIE,
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quests,3 0 and divers land disputes.3 1 It should be no surprise that
Professor Hancock consistently finds a great many of the limitations I have listed to have been designed solely for the benefit of
local persons.3 2 Whether or not one agrees with the particular results he suggests, it would be difficult not to view the exercise as a
valuable demonstration of how a functional approach can operate;
and it is equally clear that the arguments in support of specific
conclusions are very challenging. I find especially valuable the bold
chapters respecting land.3 3 It is in this area that resistance to the
new learning is perhaps at its height, and it is a field strangely
neglected by most other commentators.
Professor Hancock finds functional analysis an excellent tool
for resolving what have come to be known as "false conflict" cases,
in which, upon interpretation, only one state's law is discovered
actually to apply to the case.3 4 He finds such an analysis inadequate, however, to resolve true conflicts between the laws of two
states if both are construed to apply.3 5 The essays in the present
collection suggest a development in Professor Hancock's thinking
on what to do in this situation. In the opening chapter, describing
the three general approaches to choice-of-law problems, he is content to say that in a true conflict case "[t]he court must. . . adopt
a result-selective approach (which some commentators regard with
distaste) or fall back upon the law of the forum."3 6 By the third
chapter, first published in 1973, he seems willing to commit himself to choosing the more desirable law: "There is no reason why
judges should always indulge the polite fiction that one state's law
is just as fair and well-adjusted to modern conditions as that of
37
another.
With respect, I believe this formulation implies the wrong
question. The issue is not whether one state's law is as fair as another's, but whether it is entitled to equal legal force. When rules
are embodied in statutes, the question becomes one of separation
of powers. In all our states, the courts are expected to follow the
constitutional commands of their legislatures, not the less because
Id. ch. 9.
chs. 10-12.
32 See, e.g., id. at 140 (wrongful death limitations), 287 (charitable bequests).
3 Id. chs. 10-12.
34 See, e.g., id. at 12.
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some other legislature may have enunciated a contrary rule."8 This
seems obvious when the legislation is explicit. It is no less true
when the court concludes, by a process of interpretation, that a
less-than-explicit local statute applies to the case: the court must
follow the legislative command. If the rule is one of common law,
the court is not so constrained. Yet the elder Currie's objection to
the subordination of forum interests on a better-law basis in common law cases still persuades the younger: "[i]f a court is sufficiently convinced that a law of the forum is so obsolete that it
should not be applied in a mixed case, the courage of its convictions should lead it to abrogate the law for domestic purposes as
39
well."
At another point, Professor Hancock praises the increasing use
of better-law analysis40 on the ground of "greater realism in the
decision of choice cases. 41 Indeed one of the major contributions
of the book is its thorough demonstration that the modern choiceof-law revolution has been one of judicial candor more than of outcome. Time and again Professor Hancock reminds us of cases in
which judges who professed to adhere to the old Restatement system manipulated its manifold escape devices to avoid results that
seemed absurd: alternative classification,42 for example, or public
policy. 43 He reminds us as well that in using these devices the
courts risk predetermining future cases that ought to be governed
by different principles.4 4 Honesty is a virtue, and the willingness of
generations of judges to risk exposure for mendacity in order to
avoid following the accepted wisdom is powerful evidence that
there was something wrong with the old system. But in the last
analysis, judicial nullification of valid legislative commands must
stand or fall on its own merits.
The battle over the intractable problems of choice of law will
go on. The activities of a mobile population are not confined by

38On this matter I follow the family line. See BRAINERD CURRIE, supra note 16, at 106
("It is simply not the business of the courts to substitute their judgment for that of the
legislature."). It seems no answer to point out, as Professor Hancock does, that "courts can
and do put a restricted construction upon their own State's statutes in both domestic and
choice of law cases." HANCOCK at 128 (footnote omitted).
3 BRAINERD CURRIE, supra note 16, at 106 n.49.
40 HANCOCK at 141.
41 Id. at 78. The realism of modern approaches is a pervasive theme of this work; Han-

cock also describes the functional approach as realistic, id. at 14.
4 See, e.g., id. at 366-67 (discussing Miller v. Miller, 91 N.Y. 315 (1883)).
43 See, e.g., id. at 34-35 (discussing Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936)).
4' See, e.g., id. at 33-34 (discussing the classification of interspousal immunity as a matter of domestic relations to be determined by the law of the domicile).
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political boundaries, and there is no tidy solution for an untidy
world. The most one can ask is that the problem be approached, as
Moffatt Hancock has long approached it, with a sympathetic understanding of the competing considerations, with careful analysis
of the issues, and with a keen and penetrating mind. Studies in
Modern Choice-of-Law is a welcome record both of the modern
choice-of-law revolution and of the thinking of a major participant
in that campaign.

